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I. The Problem
Bales and his associates (Bales et al., 1951; Bales, 1953; Bales and 
Slater, 19 55; Heinicke and Bales, 19 53) have shown that task performing 
groups whose members are the same in age, sex, race, education and occupa­
tion (that is, are initially status equals) tend to develop a stable power 
and prestige order. This power and prestige order is reflected in the 
inequalities which develop in activity initiated and received and in ratings 
members make of who had the best ideas, who guided the group discussion, and 
who demonstrated leadership. Others (Harvey, 1953; Sherif et al, 1955;
Whyte, 1943) have found that an already established power and prestige 
order will determine the evaluations of performances, anticipations for 
future performances, and influence exercised.
Berger and Conner (1966) argue that such findings can be explained 
by assuming that the members of these groups come to develop, through time, 
stable conceptions of the performance capacities of each other. These con­
ceptions, or performance expectations, are beliefs about the relative task 
abilities of individuals that the members of these groups come to hold. 
Typically these expectations are differentiated; that is, they represent 
conceptions of inequalities in the task abilities of group members. If 
differentiated, these performance expectations legitimate and determine 
inequalities in opportunities to perform, in performance rates, in evaluations 
of members' contributions, and in the relative influence of different members 
on the decisions of the group. Further, they argue that these inequalities
Evaluations and the Formation and Maintenance
of Performance Expectations
־ 2 ־
in behavior, which are determined by performance expectations, operate to 
maintain these expectations. Thus, once established, the power and prestige 
order of such groups tends to be stable.^
But the assumption of a structure of performance expectations, to 
account for the known features of the power and prestige order of these 
groups, itself gives rise to a basic question: how are such performance 
expectations formed? What are the processes by which differentiated per­
formance conceptions emerge in groups whose members are initially status 
equals, and how do these conceptions become stable? This is the problem to 
which this paper is addressed. More specifically, we shall be concerned 
with isolating and conceptualizing one of the processes which we believe 
operates in the formation and maintenance of performance expectations. This 
is a process in which performance expectations are conceived of as emerging 
from, and being maintained by, the evaluations of performances individuals 
make in task-oriented situations. We shall refer to this as the evaluation- 
expectation process .
In the next section we shall present a set of assumptions to describe 
the operation of the evaluation-expectation process as it occurs within a 
specific set of interaction conditions. Following this, a mathematical model 
for our theory is developed. This model enables us to describe the features 
of the evaluation-expectation process in a highly precise manner. In the 
remainder of this paper, an experimental test of our theory and model is 
described, and the status of our formulation is evaluated in the light of our 
findings from this investigation.
^For an application and extension of this argument to the case of task- 
oriented groups whose members are initially differentiated in terms of 
socially valued status characteristics (sex, race, occupation, etc.) see 
Berger et al. (1966a).
II. Theory
A. Scope Conditions.--The theory to be presented is seen to apply to 
snail task•’־focussed groups, whose members are initially undifferentiated and 
who are collectively oriented to solving some problem. Implicit in this type 
of characterization of groups is the idea of a social situation in which 
there obtains a particular set of initial status and task conditions. Our 
first task is to specify these conditions.
We imagine a group containing two or more actors, p, o^, . . ., o״. 
However, we view the group from the point of view of one actor, say p. 
Strictly speaking the other actors, 0 ^ , 0 2  • • *> °n > are objects of orienta­
tion to p. For purposes of developing and experimentally testing our theory 
we shall confine our attention to a group with three persons, say p, o and q.
We assume p, o and q are engaged in the solution of some task, T, 
which for simplicity we view as having only two outcomes־־"success" or 
"failure." T may be almost any kind of activity, but for the theory to 
apply it must involve a series of contributions or problem-solving attempts 
by one or more of the actors. Moreover, the members of the group are 
committed to the successful completion of the task, and it is both legitimate 
and crucial for them to take each other's behavior into account in order to 
achieve this goal. In this sense the group is "task-focussed," and its 
members are "collectively oriented" in solving their problem.
One way in which we may think about performance expectations is in 
terms of the idea of task ability. If a person were believed to have a 
great deal of task ability, then he would be expected to perform well, and 
vice versa. So we require as a condition for our situation that there be
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some ability or skill associated with successfully completing T. We will 
speak of a specific performance characteristic, C, which has two states, high 
and low. Ordinarily a person who possessed the high state of C would be 
good at the task while a person with the low state would be poor at the 
task. For example, if the task were to decide jointly a series of moves in 
a chess game, then C would be chess playing ability, and, as a theoretical 
simplification, we would think of there being only good players (those with 
the high state of C) and poor players (those with the low state of C).
Since we are concerned about the formation of beliefs about task 
ability we must insure that p, o and q initially have no such beliefs.
Hence we require that two additional things be true of the actors and their 
situation. First, they must initially have no direct knowledge of their 
abilities־־that is, no direct knowledge of the states of C they or the other 
members of the group possess. Second, they must not differ on other 
characteristics which have status value for them (e.g., occupation, age, 
race and sex) from which they could infer task ability. In this sense the 
members of the group are "initially undifferentiated" and are presumed to be 
status equals.^
B. Assumptions.--The process with which we are concerned is one in 
which expectations are formed and maintained as a consequence of their 
relations to the evaluation of performances. We imagine that in an open 
interaction situation as p and the others concern themselves with their 
task, they are continually providing each other with chances to perform and 
are continually making contributions directed at successfully completing the
For a discussion of the nature of status characteristics and their 
effect upon performance expectations see Berger et al. (1966b).
task. As this takes place, p and the others are also engaged in evaluating 
each other's problem-solving attempts. On the bases of these evaluations 
they are communicating positive and negative reactions, and accepting and 
rejecting specific contributions. During the early phases of this process 
certain crucial events are seen to take place in a random manner--particularly 
the way in which chances to perform are distributed to group members and 
whether or not these chances are utilized to make problem-solving contribu­
tions. However, as the process unfolds, the evaluations (and differential 
evaluations) of performances become significant, and under certain circum­
stances p will generalize from these evaluations to the assignment of states 
of C to himself and others. Such an assignment represents the formation of 
performance-expectations. Should such an assignment occur, we assume that 
it will markedly affect p's future behavior. Specifically, it will affect 
the likelihood that he will give specific others chances to perform, that he 
will positively or negatively evaluate their contributions, and that he will 
or will not be influenced by them. Further, we believe that these behaviors 
of p, because of the way in which they are dependent upon his assignment of 
states of C, will in general operate to maintain his assignment of states of 
C. Thus, under the assumption that the task conditions are unchanged, we 
reason that, once formed, the performance expectations of p will be 
maintained.
In order to isolate the evaluation-expectation process from other 
processes which may affect the formation of expectations, we shall concern 
ourselves with a situation in which certain events of the open interaction 
situation are controlled. The assertions which follow allow us to describe 
the formation and maintenance of performance expectations in a situation
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where actors are repeatedly evaluating each other's performances. At the 
same time, other behaviors such as the giving or denying of performance 
opportunities or the differential utilization of such opportunities-- 
behaviors which might affect the formation of expectations־־have been con­
trolled .
The situation has the following structure. Imagine that p, o and q 
are given a series of task problems and that they are to select the correct 
answer to each problem from the two alternative answers which are presented. 
Suppose further that their selection of an answer has several stages.
First, each person makes a preliminary selection or initial choice between 
the alternatives. Next, after all have made their initial choice, each 
finds out what the others have selected. Last, each makes a private final 
selection. So for each task problem each person makes an initial choice 
of an answer, receives information about the initial choices of the others, 
and makes a private final choice of an answer.
From the standpoint of any one of our actors in this situation, say 
p, he is required to make an initial choice and communicate it to o and q. 
This is theoretically equivalent to his having been given a performance 
opportunity which he cannot decline. His initial choice is his performance 
output. No actor can receive more opportunities than another actor, and 
all must be responsible for the same number of performance outputs. Thus, 
inequalities in performance expectations cannot be inferred from inequalities 
in opportunities to perform or inequalities in performance rates.
If p happens to disagree with o and q about the correct answer (i.e., 
p initially selects a different alternative from o and q), then he must 
decide who is right. That is, he must decide whether to positively evaluate
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his own performance and negatively evaluate o's and q's performances, or 
vice versa. If he does the latter, that is, changes his mind, then he has 
been influenced by o and q; if he retains his original evaluations of the 
answers, he hasn't been influenced. We will assume that p disagrees with o 
and q on the answer to each task problem so that he must on repeated occasions 
decide either that "I'm right and they're wrong" or "They're right and I'm 
wrong." This can easily be arranged by appropriate experimental manipulation. 
Let us look more carefully at each of the stages of p's selecting an
3answer to a task problem. He must first select which of two possible
answers (call them A and B) is the correct one. If he thinks A is correct,
then we assume that he will actually choose A--that in this situation the
alternative he selects and communicates to others will directly reflect his
evaluation of that alternative. To put the principle more generally, any
time p evaluates the alternative answers differentially, he will, if required
to make a selection, choose that alternative he positively evaluates.
Assumption 1 ; At any stage of the process: if p positively 
evaluates one alternative and negatively evaluates the second, 
then p will select the first and reject the second.
Once p has made an initial choice, he finds out that o and q have both
chosen a different answer. We assume that p will suppose that o and q have
both acted in accord with Assumption l--that their behavior is neither random
nor capricious but, in fact, reflects their evaluations.
Assumption 2 : At any stage of the process: p associates a dis­
agreement between himself and the others on choice of alternative 
answers with different evaluations of alternatives by himself and 
the others.
We assume, for reasons that will be clear later in the discussion, that 
it makes no difference for the purpose of formulating our assumptions which 
particular task problem in the process is being considered.
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P is now forced to make a final decision. We believe that there are 
two activities going on simultaneously, or possibly alternating with each 
other at this stage. P probably is trying to decide which alternative is 
right, A or B; and also who is right, himself or the others. He might first 
decide who is correct and then what is correct, or he might first decide 
what is correct and then who is correct.
If p initially is unable to decide who is right, he is still required 
to choose between alternatives. Either he continues to view his preliminary 
choice as correct, or he changes his evaluations of the alternatives and 
makes a selection that accords with the preliminary decision of others.
These responses provide an observable indication of whether p has been 
influenced or not on a given step of the process, and we define them 
accordingly:
Definition 1 : P makes an s-response at any stage of the 
process if his final selection of an alternative is the same 
as his preliminary selection. P makes an o-response at any 
stage of the process if his final selection of an alternative 
is the same as the preliminary selection of the others.
We now assume that as a consequence of making a final decision , p
will also assign unit evaluations to persons that are consistent with the
final evaluations of alternatives that he has made. Unit evaluations of
persons are positive or negative evaluations of himself or others that are
relevant to a given step of the process. Thus, for example, if he makes an
s־response, he will come to believe, "This time I was right and they were
wrong;" or if he makes an o-response, "This is one they got, and I missed."
If p initially is able to decide who is right, then we claim he will
evaluate the alternatives A or B in accord with these unit evaluations of
persons, and by Assumption 1 his final decision is determined. Thus, on
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any step of the process, if p evaluates and chooses among alternatives, he
will then evaluate persons. If he evaluates persons, he will then evaluate
and choose among alternatives; and such evaluations of persons and alternatives
will be consistent. These ideas are embodied in Assumption 3.
Assumption 3 : At any stage of the process: if p assigns unit 
evaluations to alternatives then he will assign unit evaluations 
to persons, or if he assigns unit evaluations to persons then he 
will assign unit evaluations to alternatives; and such evaluations 
of persons and alternatives will be consistent.
Now consider the impact of p's having made unit evaluations of persons 
at a particular stage. On the basis of such unit evaluations, p may come 
to believe that he and the others differ with respect to the ability required 
for the task, and, more important, that they differ in a particular manner. 
Thus, for example, from "I was right and they were wrong in this case" p 
may be led to believe "I am better at this than they are," which is equivalent 
to assigning the positively evaluated state of C to himself and the negatively 
evaluated state of C to the others. However, we do not believe that p's 
having evaluated persons assures that he will, on any given stage of the 
process, actually assign states of C. The consequence of p's unit evaluations 
of persons, on any stage, is that the possibility then exists which did not 
exist previously for him to assign states of C. Moreover, if he does 
assign states of C, the positively evaluated state of C will always be 
assigned to the person who was given the positive unit evaluation, and the 
negatively evaluated state of C will be assigned to the negatively evaluated 
person.
Assumption 4 : At any stage of the process: given p has not a 
assigned states of C, if p assigns unit evaluations to persons 
then the possibility exists that p will also assign states of C 
to self and others and his assignment of states will be 
consistent with his unit evaluations.
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Once p has assigned states of C to self and others, we believe that 
this assignment will be stable. The stability of the assignment of expecta­
tion states is not problematical if p believes himself to be more competent 
than the others and makes an s-response, or if he believes himself to be 
less competent and makes an o־response, because his unit evaluations of 
persons in these cases are consistent with his assignment of states of C.
If, however, p believes himself more competent and makes an o-response, or 
believes himself less competent and makes an s-response--possibilities which 
we do not exclude in our formulation־-his unit evaluations of persons are 
inconsistent with his assignment of states of C. Thus it is not self-evident 
that p's assignment of states will remain unchanged. We argue that this 
stability in the assignment of expectation states is a function of at least 
two important features of the evaluation-expectation process: (1) the way 
in which the assignment of states of C affects the subsequent assignment of 
unit evaluations of persons, and (2) a change in significance of unit 
evaluations of persons given an assignment of expectation states.
Given that p has already assigned states of C to self and others, he 
now has a basis other than the properties of the task for assigning unit 
evaluations to persons. In fact, we assume that the assignment of states of 
C, once it has occurred as a consequence of unit evaluations, will in turn 
affect the way in which p subsequently assigns unit evaluations to persons.
Assumption 5 : At any stage of the process: if p has assigned 
positively and negatively evaluated states of C to self and 
others, then he will tend to assign positive and negative unit 
evaluations to self and others consistent with his assignment 
of states of C.
Assumption 5 has several important implications which are relevant to 
the issue of the stability of expectation states. First, once p has assigned
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states of C to self and others, his process of making final decisions is 
more likely to be structured in the order who is right and then what is 
right than was true before he assigned states of C. Second, taken with 
earlier assumptions, 5 implies that if p believes he possesses the high 
state of C and others the low, he is more likely to make s־responses than a 
p who has not assigned states of G. Similarly, if p believes he possesses 
the low state of C and others the high, he is more likely to make o־responses 
than a p who has not assigned states of C. Thus, once p has assigned states 
of Ci he is expected to be more frequently making those very responses which 
are consistent with these assigned states.
Aside from the process described by Assumption 5, stability of assign­
ment is also seen to be related to a change in the significance of unit- 
evaluations of persons. Given an assignment of G, inconsistent unit 
evaluations are more likely to be subject by p to special interpretations. 
Thus, for example, if p believes himself more competent than others and 
makes an o־response, this behavior is more likely to be dismissed, minimized, 
or rationalized as a ,'special event" than the case where a p has not yet 
assigned states of C. As a consequence, after assignment of states of C, 
inconsistent evaluations tend to become irrelevant to changes in p's 
beliefs about task ability. Therefore, we argue,
Assumption 6 : At any stage of the process: if p has assigned 
positively and negatively evaluated states of C, this assignment 
is maintained.
C. The Mathematical Model.--It is now possible on the basis of our 
assumptions and arguments to begin the construction of a mathematical model 
for more precisely describing the formation of p's expectations and the 
resultant changes in whether he is influenced by the others. Let us begin
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by labelling the three possibilities for p's assignment of states of C. 
First, p may believe he possesses the high state of C and o and q the low 
state. lie will designate this by the symbol [־h] where the first entry in 
the bracket denotes p's expectations for himself and the second entry his 
expectations for the others. If p believes he possesses the negatively 
evaluated state of C and the others the positively evaluated state then we 
will designate that by [־+]. Finally, p may not have assigned states of C 
and we will designate that by [0 0].
In line with Definition 1, we shall continue to employ a short 
designation for whether p is influenced or not. If p is not influenced, we 
say that he made an s־response; if he is influenced, that he made an 
o־response.
Our sbustantive formulation says that if p begins the series of task 
problems in [0 0], he may at some time change to [+-] or [־+! as a result 
of his decisions about who is right. If he changes from [0 0] to [+־] he 
will make more s־responses, and if he changes to [־+] he will make more 
o־responses. The model we have formulated asserts in addition that in order 
to understand p's decision behavior for any particular task problem we need 
know only what his expectations were before he began to work on that 
problem (and not what his previous decisions about who is right were) and 
how his decision about who is right on the current problem will change his 
expectations before the next problem is presented.
Suppose that before he begins to solve a particular task problem p is 
in [0 0]. We know that when faced with making his final choice p will 
sometimes make an s־response and at other times make an o-response. We 
assert that there is a specifiable and stable probability (call it Q^) that
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he will make an s־response on that problem which does not depend on his past 
behavior but only on the fact that he is in [0 0]. Thus, no matter which 
problem p is attempting to solve and no matter how p has solved previous 
problems, the model asserts that he will make an s־response with a fixed 
probability if he is in state [0 0]. Similarly, we assert that if p is in 
[+-] he will make an s־response with probability and if he is in [־+] 
with probability 0/^. As a first approximation we assume that & 's do not 
differ across individuals.
If p is in [0 0] and makes an s-response, Assumption 4 in conjunction 
with Assumption 1 tells us that the possibility exists for him to assign 
states of C which are consistent with his decision. That is, the possibility 
exists for him to infer from his feeling that "This time, I was right and 
they were wrong," that he is better than the others. Hence, there is a 
possibility of his moving to the [+־] state following his s־response. We 
assert that there will be a specifiable and stable probability (call it r) 
that p will move to [+־] and that the value of the probability will not depend 
on his prior responses . By a similar line of reasoning we assert that if p 
is in [0 0] and makes an o-response, then he will move to [־+] with 
probability d.
Once p has moved to either [+־] or [-+] Assumption 6 tells us that he 
will remain in that state for the remainder of the series of problems. 
Moreover, Assumption 5 taken in conjunction with earlier assumptions implies 
that the probability that p will make an s-response once he is in a new 
state will be different than previously. In particular, o t will be greater 
than and will be less than
The possibilities and their probabilities of occurrence for a particular 
task problem can be represented by a set of three tree diagrams, one for each
kind of assignment of the states of C that are possible for p before he 
begins to solve a problem. Figure 1 shows the diagrams for this process.
Figure 1 about here
This formulation of the process means that we have a Markov Chain with the 
expectations that p holds for himself and the others as the states of the 
chain. The one step transition matrix for the chain can be easily computed 
from Figure 1 and is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
The initial vector of the chain is also easily obtained. We assume 
that everyone begins the process in [0 0]. Thus the initial distribution 
vector contains a 1 for that state and zeros for the other states.
III. The Experiment
Recall from our previous discussion that the theory applies to a 
situation in which three individuals, p and two others, are engaged in the 
solution of a task, T, which has two outcomes-־success and failure. An 
ability is associated with the solution of T, and initially p and the others 
have no opinion of each other's ability and are not aware of any external 
status differences between themselves. Through time, as p and the others 
attempt to complete T, they evaluate the contributions which each is making 
toward the solution of T, and on the basis of those evaluations accept and 
reject these contributions. The theory asserted that each person would
־[ ]+s-response
־[ ]+
־[ ]+
o־response
1+ ]־s-response
+[ ]־
1+ ]־
o-response
Figure 1. Tree diagrams showing probabilities of each 
kind of response given the expectation state 
and probabilities of state changes following 
responses.
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Figure 2. One step transition matrix for change of expectation 
states.
generalize from performance evaluations to beliefs about relative ability and 
that their beliefs about ability would then come to govern their evaluations 
of performances and the acceptance of influence.
The experiment which was carried out focussed upon the evaluations of 
contributions and the acceptance of influence. Three subjects were confronted 
with an n-step decision process in which each made an initial choice between 
binary alternatives, received information about the other persons' initial 
choices, and, on the basis of evaluations of those choices, made a private 
final choice between the alternatives. Communicated initial choices were 
taken to be equivalent to performance outputs where the person was always 
given an opportunity to perform and always accepted that opportunity. Thus 
differences in opportunities to perform and in rates of performances, which 
might occur in the open interaction situation, were controlled. The 
communication of initial choices was further controlled by the experimenter 
so that each person would continually disagree with the others on initial 
choices, and, hence, would always have to differentially evaluate them.
The private final choices of each person were taken to be equivalent to 
acceptance and rejection of influence from the others.
There were other restrictions placed upon the experimental situation.
Each binary choice was required to be "nearly veridical," meaning that in 
each case there would exist a perceivable "correct" choice and sufficient 
ambiguity about the choice to create uncertainty. Each subject was to be 
task-focussed; that is, motivated to make the correct final choice.
There were 42 trials in the experiment. For each trial the subjects 
were seated in booths with separate panels of lights and buttons so ־:. 
that none could see the movements of the others. To make his initial 
choice a subject pushed one of two labelled buttons. After having 
pressed his button, one of a set of two lights came on informing him
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which button the other subjects had pushed. To make his final choice, a 
subject pushed one of another set of two buttons. The buttons on each panel 
were connected to a master control panel so that choices could be monitored 
and recorded and so that which one of the pair of information lights came on 
could be controlled. As indicated above, it was arranged that on all trials, 
with the exception of two preliminary trials, a subject was led to believe 
that the other subjects' preliminary choices differed from his own.
Subjects were instructed to make what they felt to be the correct 
preliminary choice, and after having taken the information from the other 
subjects into consideration, to make what they felt was the correct final 
choice. To operationalize collective־orientation it was repeatedly emphasized 
to the subjects that it should be of no importance whether their initial and 
final choices coincided, that the utilization of advice and information 
from others was both legitimate and crucial, and that it was primarily 
important that they make a correct final choice.
To operationally define "success" and "failure" at the decision-making 
task, a set of "standards" with respect to number of correct final choices 
was presented to each set of subjects. A score of 31-40 correct final 
decisions was defined as "good" and a score of from 0-30 correct final 
decisions was defined as ranging from ‘,poor" to only "fair."
The actual task used was a variant of a previously developed visual 
perception task (see Moore, 1965; and Conner, 1966). Subjects viewed a 
series of rectangles which were divided, checkerboard fashion, into smaller, 
equal sized rectangles, either black or white in color. Each larger rectangle 
was projected from a 35mm slide to a screen, and subjects were asked to choose 
whether there were more white or more black smaller rectangles within the 
larger one. As already indicated, the decision with respect to any particular
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slide was a near veridical decision in the sense that a high proportion of 
the time it is expected that a subject would choose the correct alternative 
(i.e., the color which did in fact cover more of the area) although there is 
enough ambiguity about the decision that influence is possible.
To operationalize the idea of a performance characteristic or ability 
which is instrumental to the successful completion of the task, subjects were 
told that the ability to choose the correct answers to the slides was a 
newly discovered ability called "spatial judgment" ability, and that the 
ability was unrelated to other skills that they might already possess. The 
latter instruction was given to insure that a subject would not use knowledge 
of special skills he already had to infer his spatial judgment ability.
In order to control for any lack of homogeneity between task slides, 
and hence to control for possible spurious effects due to task properties, 
the order of presentation of the slides was specified by a two-stage random­
ization. First, the 40 slides were randomly assigned a number from 1 to 40 
and ordered according to those numbers. The resulting relative order was 
fixed for all experiments. Second, for each experiment the slide which was 
presented first was randomly selected. Thus, if the initial slide was 
selected to be 23, the actual order of presentation in the experiment would 
be 23, 24, 25, . . ., 38, 39, 40, 1, 2, 3, . . ., 20, 21, 22.
The order of events as they occurred in the experiment began with the 
reading by the experimenter of the instructions for the experiment. The 
instructions explained the routine mechanics of the experiment, the nature 
of the task and of the decisions, and other special requirements or features 
such as scoring standards, emphasis on the final choice, etc.
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Following the reading of the instructions the experimenter presented 
42 slides, although the subjects were told that there were only 40. The 
extra 2 slides were included in order to be able to arrange agreement trials 
at the beginning to allay suspicion of the manipulation of the information 
exchange. On the remaining 40 trials the subjects continually disagreed on 
preliminary choices. At the end of the slide series, a short questionnaire 
was administered which asked each subject to rate his and his partners' per­
formances on the test and to predict future performance for himself and his 
partners on a similar test in which each worked separately. A post session 
interview was then conducted in which the attempt was made to ascertain if 
experimental manipulations were successful, if the subject became suspicious 
of the manipulated disagreements, and if the subject's perception of and 
behavior in the situation coincided with the interpretation which the 
experimenter was making of it. The interviewer also fully explained to each 
subject the purpose of the study and made him aware of the aspects of the 
experiment which involved deception. Each subject was asked to not discuss 
the experiment with his friends.
IV. Analysis of Results
A. Subject Population.--Ninety-five subjects, each a male undergraduate 
from a local junior college, participated in the experiment. We eliminated 
32 of these from the analysis because they became suspicious of one or more 
of the deceptions. We decided a subject had become suspicious if:
1. He volunteered the information in the post session interview 
that he thought the exchange of information was "rigged."
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2. He had read previously about deception experiments (such
as the Asch conformity experiments) and thought the present 
experiment was similar.
3. He had heard from others that there was deception in the 
present experiment.
4. He had participated previously in a deception experiment 
and thought the present experiment was similar.
Three subjects were eliminated from the analysis when post session 
interview revealed that they had become confused by the experimental procedure 
and did not understand what kind of information was being furnished to them 
about the choice behavior of the other members of their groups. Another two 
subjects were eliminated from the analysis because they represented a viola­
tion of the initial condition of the theory requiring that each subject begin 
the process equal in status to the other subject. Data from any subject who 
had an obvious physical characteristic which could be interpreted as a status 
characteristic (such as being a Negro) or who participated with someone else 
who had such a characteristic was not included. This left 58 subjects whose 
response data could be examined to test the theory.
B. Models to be Examined.--The most general form of our model is the 
5-parameter version, which allows movement to either of the two differentiated 
expectation states. This is the form of the model we are most interested in 
and the one we believe will describe the process for this particular 
situation.
However, we will investigate two other versions of the model--a 
1-parameter Bernoulli process model, and a 3-parameter model. The 1-parameter
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model is obtained when both r and d are zero. This model assumes the 
occurrence of a process in which there is no change of behavior as a function 
of the evaluational activities of the members of the group. Thus, although 
technically a special case of our general model, the substantive claims of 
the 1-parameter model are different from those developed in the assumptions 
of our evaluation-expectation theory. Therefore, we examine it as a baseline 
model from which to compare the predictions of our other models. Two different 
forms of 3-parameter models can be obtained from our general model, one by 
setting d=0 and restricting movement only to the [+-] state, and the second 
by setting r=0 thereby restricting movement only to the [־+] state. Both of 
these forms do assume the occurrence of a process in which expectations emerge 
as a function of behavior and changes in behavior occur as a function of the 
formation of expectations. However, they differ in their characterization of 
the particular form of the evaluation-expectation process. In an experiment 
reported by Conner (1966) which was identical to the present one except that 
each subject was confronted with a single other subject, it was found that 
change from the undefined expectation state was only to the [+-] state. It 
is possible for that to have happened in the present experiment even though 
each subject was confronted by two other subjects. But it is also possible 
for the majority effect to have become of overriding importance restricting 
movement to only the [־+] state. Since at this stage we do not know the 
specific form of the evaluation-expectation process for the particular case 
involved in our experiment, we shall also consider these two 3-parameter 
versions of our general model in examining the results of this experiment.
C. Parameter Estimation.--Our analysis of the response data will 
consist of a comparison of the empirically obtained values of a list of
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quantities with the values of those same quantities obtained from computer 
simulations of the process. The simulation values represent approximations 
of the values that would have been arrived at from analytic expressions for 
the quantities. As with many models like ours, however, these analytic 
expressions are difficult, and in some cases impossible, to obtain.
Before simulations could be conducted, estimates for each of the 
parameters of the model had to be obtained. The procedure we used is des­
cribed in the appendix of this paper and is discussed in detail in Berger 
et al. (1968). For our present purposes it is sufficient to state that in 
each case a series of expressions involving the parameters was obtained for 
the expected frequencies of certain response events. Because the expressions 
are complicated, values for the parameters could not be obtained by setting 
the expressions equal to empirical quantities and analytically solving the 
resulting system of equations. Rather, approximate values were arrived at 
by numerically solving the system of equations with the help of a computer. 
For the 5־parameter model it was found that = .690 (»^ is the probability 
of an s-response in the [0 0] state), = •846 (Q^ is the probability of an 
s־response in the [+-] state), ot = .320 (a^ is the probability of an s- 
response in the [-+] state), r = .030 (r is the probability of moving on one 
trial from the [0 0] to the [+-] state), and d = .025 (d is the probability 
of moving on one trial from the £0 0] to the [-+] state). Since the values 
obtained for r and d were so similar we decided to work with a simpler model 
that assumes r = d. Vie obtained new estimates for this 4-parameter model 
and they are given below:
or = .698 
o846. = 2׳ 
c*3 = .332 
r = d = .028
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Notice that the estimates are in accord with our theoretical expectations that 
# 2  would be greater than which would in turn be greater than o/^.
For the simpler 3־parameter model we were also able to obtain estimates. 
The estimates for the three parameters are given below:
a = .462 
<*2 = .782 
r - .186
Because the estimation procedure is independent of the content of the one 
state to which movement is allowed, and since > > t^ie on^y 3-parameter 
model that is possible is one which restricts movement to only the [+-] state. 
Therefore, we can already conclude that a model which allows movement to only 
the [-+] state cannot describe the observed process.
In estimating the parameter in the Bernoulli model it was not necessary 
to use the complicated procedure above. Rather the simple maximum likelihood 
estimate based on the proportion of s-responses per trial for all trials and 
subjects was computed. It was found that:
or = .696
D. Principal Results.--Since there are no absolute rules for deciding 
on an adequate list of model testing quantities, there is a certain degree 
of arbitrariness in selecting empirical features of the data to examine. We 
did attempt to select (1) quantities that would characterize what we believe 
are substantively significant features of the data as well as (2) quantities 
V7hich would allow us to discriminate between the three models. The second 
of these criteria is of special significance since the evaluation of any 
specific model is based in part on how adequate it is in comparison to some 
theoretically relevant second model.
- 23 ־
Since changes in the rate of acceptance of influence are of particular 
substantive importance, the first quantity we will examine is the proportion 
of s-responses on successive trials. We will examine both the observed 
curve and simulation curves based on each of the models. The Simulations 
were standard Monte-Carlo simulations in which a computer generated pseudo­
random numbers whose values determined responses and state changes for a 
fixed number of "subjects." We generated 40 different sets of data, each set 
based on 58 subjects and 40 trials. From each set we calculated the value of 
the quantities being examined and then calculated the average of those values 
over the 40 sets of data.
Let us first consider the predictions that each of these models make 
for the curve of s־responses. The predictions of the l־parameter model are 
straightforward. Since the process postulated here is one in which no change 
of behavior is assumed to have occurred, the curve for the mean proportion of 
s־responses should be constant through time. The predictions of the 3־parameter 
model for this quantity are also straightforward but markedly different. In 
the process postulated by this model, our subjects are initially in an 
undifferentiated state in which they are making s-responses at a rate of 46%.
As the process unfolds, these subjects move into high-low states in which 
they are now making s-responses at a rate of 78%. Further, since the estimated 
change of state parameter is relatively large (r = .186) given the number of 
trials involved, almost all subjects will have moved to the high-low state 
by the end of the experiment. Therefore the 3-parameter model predicts a 
sharply increasing curve of s-responses. The situation for the 4־parameter 
model is considerably more subtle. In the process assumed to have occurred 
under this model, all subjects start out in an undifferentiated state where
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the rate of s־responses is near 70%. As the experiment continues, some move 
to [+-] where the s-response rate is 85% and some to the [-+] where the rate 
is only 33%. Thus the decrease in the rate of s-responses for those moving 
into the low-high state is approximately 2.4 times the size of the increase 
in these responses for those moving to the high-low state. However, the 
relative likelihood of moving into one type of differentiated state as 
compared to a second is a function of the rate at which responses, consistent 
with these expectation states, are occurring in the undifferentiated state.
The estimates for this model tell us that while the subject is in the un­
differentiated state, s-responses, which are consistent with a high-low 
state, are occurring at approximately 2.3 times the rate of o-responses 
(70% vs. 30%). Therefore, we should expect to find roughly the same difference 
in the numbers who have moved into high-low states as compared to low-high 
states. Thus the effect of differences in the change of response rate is 
compensated for by the effect of differences in the change of state fre­
quencies. As a consequence, while postulating the occurrence of a considerably 
more complex process than the 1-parameter model, the 4־parameter model makes 
essentially the same prediction for this quantity; namely, that the 
s-response curve will be constant.
Figure 3 shows the average proportion of s-responses for successive 
blocks of eight trials for both observed and simulated responses. The 
observed curve is based on the responses of 58 subjects, and each simulated 
curve is based on the average of 40 sets of the responses of 58 subjects--in 
effect 2,320 subjects.
Figure 3 about here
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Figure 3־ Proportion of s-responses per trial, computed for blocks 
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The observed curve is clearly more consistent with the curves of the 1־ 
and 4-parameter models and is within the limits of variation of those curves. 
The 3־parameter curve is definitely not an accurate description of the 
observed curve.
The second quantity we will examine is alternations. An alternation is 
a pair of adjacent responses where one is an s־response and the other an o- 
response. In particular we are interested in changes in alternating behavior 
through time. Such a quantity provides us with information on changes in the 
relative stability and instability of the subject's response behavior as the 
process evolves. The predictions from the l־parameter model are again 
straightforward. It predicts no change in the degree of consistency in 
s-responses; therefore, the curve for the mean proportion alternations 
through time should be constant. In the case of the 3-parameter model, 
however, a change is predicted. This follows only in part from the fact 
that this model assumes a process in which a change of state has occurred.
What is relevant here is that in moving into a high-low state the subject is 
now making a particular type of response, for example s-responses, at a 
rate closer to 100% than was the case while he was in the undifferentiated 
state (78% vs. 48%). As a consequence, this model predicts a general decrease 
through time in the mean proportion of alternations. The predictions from 
the 4-parameter model are similar to those from the 3-parameter one, although 
the argument is slightly more complicated. For the subjects who have moved 
into the low-high state there should be no change in their rate of alternating 
behavior. The rate at which these subjects are making their most frequent 
responses in the low-high state (o-responses, 67% of the time) is not sig­
nificantly closer to (or farther from) the 1007» level than the rate of their
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most frequent response while in the undifferentiated state (s-responses, 70% 
of the time). Therefore, for these subjects the model claims that there was 
no increase in the degree of consistency in their behavior. On the other 
hand, for those subjects who have moved from the undifferentiated state into 
the high-low state, the rate of their most frequent response, s-responses, has 
shifted significantly close to the 100% level (707» vs. 85%). For these 
subjects change of state also involves increase in the consistency of their 
behavior. Consequently, the overall prediction of this model is that the 
mean proportion of alternations decreases through time.
Figure 4 shows the average proportion of alternations for successive 
blocks of transitions for both observed and simulated data.
Figure 4 about here
The curves predicted by the 3־parameter and the 4-parameter model show 
the expected decrease of alternations through time and are in good agreement 
with the observed curve. The 1-parameter curve, as expected, is flat and is 
clearly not an adequate representation of the observed curve. So although 
the 1-parameter model could predict the s-response curve it does not predict 
the alternations curve, and while the 3-parameter model failed to predict 
the s-response curve it does predict the alternations curve. The 4-parameter 
model is consistent with both curves.
The third quantity we will examine is the variance among subjects at 
different times in the process in their likelihood of making s-responses. We 
examined blocks of eight trials and computed the variance of the number of 
s-responses per subject for each block. The predictions of the three models
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for this quantity are quite different. The 3־parameter model claims that 
during the earlier phases of the process there are subjects in the undif­
ferentiated state, and because the value of r is so large, there are some 
subjects who have already moved into a high-low state. Thus, during these 
phases s-responses are being generated by two populations, one at a rate near 
46% and the other at a rate near 78%. However, the large value of r also 
means that by the end of the process almost all subjects will have moved to 
the high-low state and thus will be making s-responses at the same general 
rate. Therefore, this model predicts that overall the variance among subjects 
should decrease through time. The 4-parameter model claims that during the 
earlier phases of the process most subjects are still in the undifferentiated 
state making s-responses at a rate near 70%. Further, since the values of 
the change of state parameters in this case are small, at the end of the 
process we should find three groups of subjects : those who have moved to 
high-low, those who have moved to low-high, and those still in the undif­
ferentiated state. Subjects in each of these states will be making s-responses 
at different rates (70%, 85%, and 33%). Hence this model predicts that 
overall the variance among subjects should increase with time. For the 1־ 
parameter model, since no change of state is assumed to occur, no change in 
the number of subpopulations producing s־responses at different rates is 
predicted. As a consequence, the variance of s-responses among subjects 
should be constant through time.
Figure 5 shows the observed and simulated curves.
Figure 5 about here
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Figure 5o Variance of the number of s-responses per subject, computed 
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It is clear that neither the 3-parameter nor the 1-parameter curve is 
consistent with the observed curve. The 4־parameter curve is not an exact 
match to the observed curve but is certainly the most nearly consistent curve. 
It is not known whether the departures in this latter case are attributable 
to sampling variation or not.
E. Overall Assessment of Fit.--The 4-parameter model seems to have pro­
vided a much better account of the three observed quantities we examined than 
did the 3־parameter model or the l־parameter model. Table 1 presents in 
summary form the particular results of our analysis.
Table 1 about here
The only model which predicted all quantities was the 4-parameter model,
although it was not as successful as we would like on the blocked variance
curve. The 1-parameter model failed in predicting the alternations curve and
the blocked variance curve. The 3-parameter model also failed in predicting
4two quantities--the s-response curve and the blocked variance curve.
The significance of these findings merits some further discussion. The 
finding that the 4-parameter model is in general more adequate than the 3- 
parameter model in accounting for our results is, in the first instance, of 
factual significance. It tells us that for this particular case of p inter­
acting with two others--as contrasted with the cases, for example, in which 
he is interacting with one other or three others-־the assumption of a process 
in which two differentiated states emerge in differing proportions is more 
tenable than that of a process in which only one differentiated state (either 
[־+] or [+־]) is formed. In what ways the evaluation-expectation process is
^For the results of a more extensive analysis and comparison of the 
relative fits of the 3- and 4-parameter models, see Berger, et al., 1968.
Table 1
Summary of whether each model was or was not successful in predicting 
the process trends of the three quantities which were examined.
Models
Quantities 1-parameter 3־parameter 4-parameter
Proportion of s-responses 
per trial yes no Yes
Proportion of alternations 
per transition no yes yes
Variance of number 
of s-responses per subject no no yes
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affected by increases in the size of the group (as one possible variation on 
this experiment) can only be answered by further experimentation.
On the other hand, the superiority of the 4־parameter model to the 1־ 
parameter model provides us with information of a different nature. It 
tells us that the assumption of a process in which there is no change of 
behavior as a consequence of the evaluational activities of the members of 
the group is inadequate (in a comparative sense) in accounting for these 
experimental results. Since changes of state and behavior are basic features 
of our evaluation-expectation theory, the inadequacy of the no change model 
is a result of general theoretical significance.
V . Summary
We began our investigation with the general argument that the known 
features of power and prestige orders which emerge in task performing groups 
can be accounted for by assuming that the members of these groups come to 
hold stable and typically differentiated conceptions of the performance 
capacities of each other. This argument, in turn, poses the problem of: 
how do these stable differentiated conceptions, performance expectations, 
develop in task groups? We believe that one of the ways in which performance 
expectations are formed involves the generalization of evaluations made by 
group members of each other's problem-solving attempts. In order to isolate 
and investigate this process we have constructed a theory which describes its 
operation in a situation where actors are continually evaluating and accepting 
or rejecting each other's performances but where other behaviors, which might 
affect the formation of expectations, have been controlled. On the basis of
the assertions of our theory, we reason that the occurrence of differential 
performance evaluations will lead the actor to form differentiated performance 
expectations. Once these expectations are formed, the actor's evaluations of 
subsequent performances will tend to be consistent with these expectations, 
and the rate at which he is influenced by others will be accordingly changed. 
Finally, since his behavior will tend to be in accord with his expectations 
the process becomes self-maintaining. Thus, under the given task conditions, 
his expectations, once formed, will remain unchanged.
An experiment was conducted in order to investigate the process described 
by our theory. The experiment consisted of a series of forty trials on each 
of which subjects made an initial choice between tiro alternative answers to 
a task problem presented, exchanged information with the other two subjects 
about initial choices, and made a private final choice. The exchange of 
information was controlled by the experimenter so that on each trial each 
subject believed that he had selected a different alternative from the one 
the other subjects selected. Each subject's initial choice was his performance 
output for that trial, his evaluation (or réévaluation) of the choice alterna­
tives after exchanging information was his unit performance evaluation, and his 
final choice indicated his acceptance or rejection of influence on that trial. 
It was predicted that the evaluations each subject made of his own and the 
others' performances on each trial would lead him to form performance expecta­
tions for himself and for the others. Since he was always in disagreement with 
the others, we assumed that either he would come to believe himself better at 
the task than the others or worse. In the former case his rate of acceptance 
of influence would drop while in the latter ease his rate would rise.
We constructed a Markov chain model which formalizes the process des­
cribed by our theory. The states of the chain were the expectations p could
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hold for himself and the others. Either his expectations would be unformed,
state [0 0]; or he would hold high expectations for himself and low for
the others, state [+־]; or he would hold low expectations for himself and
high for the others, state [־+]. For each state we assigned a probability of
not accepting influence (s־response) on any trial for any person in that
state. Movement between states was hypothesised to be restricted to either
moving with a fixed probability from [0 0] to [+-] on any one trial after
making an s־response, or moving with a fixed probability from [0 0] to [-+]
on any one trial after making an o-response (accepting influence). This
results in a model with five parameters which are restated below:
P (s-response in [0 0]) =*
P (s-response in [+-]) = a2
P (s-response in [-+]) -
P (moving from [0 0] to [+-] 
after an s-response) ~ r
P (moving from [0 0] to [-+] 
after an o-response) = d
We also considered two other models--a 3-parameter model in which movement
either to [+־] is not allowed (r = 0) or in which movement to [-+] is not
allowed (d = 0), and a 1-parameter model which did not allow any change of
state.
Estimates of the parameter values for each of the models was carried 
out and we were able to immediately reject the 3-parameter model with r = 0 
because it was found that the probability of an s-response increases if 
movement is restricted to only one state. For the remaining version of the 
3־parameter model, the 5-parameter model, and the 1-parameter model, 
reasonable estimates for all parameters were obtained. Additionally, it was
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found that for the 5־parameter model, r =d. Consequently we simplified it 
to a 4־parameter model with the same parameter governing movement to either 
[+־ ] or [-+].
The evaluation of the fit of the three models was carried out by 
comparing the observed values of three empirical quantities with the values 
of those same quantities obtained by computer simulation of the response 
process specified by each model. We found that the predictions of the 4 ־ 
parameter model were clearly in greater accord with the observed data than 
those of either the 3-parameter model or the 1-parameter model.
These findings enable us to conclude (1) that the assumption of a 
process in which there are no changes in behavior will not adequately 
describe the observed process; and (2) the assumption of an evaluation- 
expectation process in which two differentiated states are seen to emerge, 
in differing proportions, does provide a generally adequate basis for 
characterizing the observed behavior in this particular case.
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APPENDIX 
PARAMETER ESTIMATION
Introduction
In this appendix we describe the parameter estimation technique for 
the 3-, 4-, and 5־parameter models considered in Section IV. The experiment 
on which the estimation of parameters is based, it will be recalled, consists 
of observing s subjects for t trials with s = 58 and t = 40 for the 
experiment considered in this report. Each subject gives a sequence of 
s־responses and o־responses; the observation for a subject i is the vector
Cx i l »  x i 2 > * ’ ־ x i t > where
til1 if the i subject's response on trial j 
is an s-response,
fch0 if the i subject's response on trial j 
is an o-response.
Given s observations of this type, the problem is to estimate the parameters 
of the 3-, 4-, and 5־parameter models.
Section 1. An Estimator Based on the Expectation of Tuples
A strategy to specify an appropriate estimation technique is relatively 
simple: choose those parameter values as estimates which give the "best" 
fit for the observed values of some statistics computed from the observed 
data to the statistics' theoretical expressions evaluated using the chosen 
parameter values. This strategy requires us to specify which quantities are 
to be employed along with some criterion specifying what constitutes "best" 
fit.
A-2
The expected number of 3 tuples of a given type in a response sequence 
was chosen as an appropriate quantity. Since the response sequence is binary 
there are 8 different types of 3 tuples, that is, 000, 001, . . . , 111.
Let us denote these tuples in the order given as T^! T^> • • • ! Tg. By 
expected number of 3 tuples in a response sequence we refer to E(T^) which 
gives the expected number of tuples of the type T^ in a hypothetical response 
sequence. The theoretical expressions for E(T^) will be derived in Section 2. 
The observed values of these quantities may be obtained by tabulating instances 
of each event T^ across trials by the usual "overlapping" tabulating technique 
and across subjects. Let the observed frequency of these events be given by 
N(T^). The observed mean number of tuples, T^, in a response sequence is 
then given by
« V  ,
s
where s is the number of subjects.
The criterion for the "best" fit is a least־square measure of discrepancy 
between observed and predicted of the form,
t  N(Ti> V  
(  « * ! >  -  - h ) •
Finding the "best" fit involves finding that set of parameter values which
minimizes the sum of the discrepancies over all permissible values of i. Thus,
we want to minimize the function,
8 / N(T.) \2
( i )  f c v w r . d )  ־ ^  (  E(T!> ־ T  j  •
To minimize this function we need to take the partial derivative with respect 
to each of the parameters, set the partials equal to 0, and solve the result­
ing set of equations. For the 5־parameter model we would have 5 equations in
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5 unknowns, the unknowns being the parameters , a^׳ , o/^> r, d. Again the 
modifications necessary to handle the 3- and 4־parameter models are straight­
forward and will not be considered.
Due to the complexity of the partial derivatives, however, in practice 
the minimization is accomplished through the use of a numerical routine 
implemented in a computer program. Since most well established computer 
languages now have library programs which will minimize a function of several 
variables, the technical details of this minimization are omitted. The set 
of parameters which are found to give the function minimum are taken to be 
the parameter estimates. The parameter estimates given in Section IVC for 
the 3-, 4-, and 5-parameter models were obtained by this method. In the 
following section the estimator obtained by the strategy described in this 
section will be referred to as the tuple estimator.
Section 2. Derivation of ECT^)
The theoretical expressions derived here are for the 5-parameter model. 
Theoretical expressions for the 3 and 4 parameter models are obtained by 
taking the expressions for the 5-parameter model and setting d = 0 or r = 0 
for a particular 3-parameter model and setting r = d for the 4-parameter model. 
To derive expressions for E(T^) , note that this expression may be written in 
terms of the underlying states of the expectation process as
3
(2) E(T.) = Y. Pr(T./state k)E(state k) ,
k=l
where E(state k) refers to the expected number of steps in state k.
Equation 2 states that the expected number of tuples of a particular type is
the probability of the tuple given the state times the expected number of 
steps in the given state summed over all states.
First, let us derive the expected number of steps in each of the states. 
The transition matrix for the 5־parameter model is
] + ־ [
P = [0 0]
] ־ + [
Where = 1 - Qnd 9 is defined as 1 0 ^־ r ־ Q^d = <*^ r + o^׳ d. The initial
]+־[ [0 0] ]־+[
1 0 0
0/ r e c?.d1 1
0 0 1
distribution vector is assumed to be given by
p ° = (0,1,0) .
It is well known that p , the vector giving the probability that the process 
will be in each of the states after j steps, is given by
It can easily be
p J = p pJ .
5־ j jThus, to obtain p we must find the expression for P ,
fchshown that raising P to the j power gives
[0 0] ]+־[
1 0
0j
] ־ + [
0
or . r ( i - e J) . d ( ! - e j) . ____־a .1 J
1-0
100
] + ־ [
>j = [0 0]
] ־ + [
To obtain p ־* we take the product p °P־* which gives
A-5
This expression gives the probability vector containing the probabilities that
the process will be in state k after j steps (k = 2, 1, and 3, respectively).
However, the state transitions occur after the subject makes an s־response
or an o-response. That is, we assume that the completion of the subject's
response is prior to the state transitions; thus, the first state transition
occurs after the subject's first s-response or o־response, the second state
transition occurs after the subject's second s־response or o־response, and
־־/ iso forth. In terms of the trial number where p' is redefined as giving the 
probability vector for trial j we have
c r r ( l ־e j_:L) . . c T d ( ! ■ ^ 1־ ) \f . _  / y d - e -  ) gj-i g 1 ^
V  1-0 ’ 5 1־e J  '
לי­­ק
The expected number of steps in state k may now be obtained by summing the 
probabilities of being in state k over trials to t 2 ־, where, assuming the 
first 3 tuple is considered to begin on trial 1, the last 3 tuple begins on 
trial t 2 ־. Performing this operation for each of the states we obtain
t 2 ־
1-0
and(
־
(4) E(state 2) = ( t 2 ־)
/ ״ , d v  “ d l H ־ ־ )
(5) E(state 3) = ( t 2 ־) ( —  ) * --  .
v  1-0 '  (1-0)
Thus we have derived the expected number of times the process will be in each 
state for a sequence t 2 ־ trials long.
We must now obtain expressions for Pr(T^/state k) for each state k and 
each T^. If we have state 2, [+־], or state 3, [־+], we have a Bernoulli 
process with parameter 01 ^  an<^  Q3 ׳> respectively. Table A1 gives the appropriate 
expressions for Pr(Ti/state k), k = 2 or 3.
A-6
Table Al about here
For state 1, however, we must resort to a tree diagram to obtain expressions 
for each type of 3 tuple. Figure Al gives the tree diagram needed to obtain 
Pri^/state 1).
Figure Al about here
Table A2 gives the probabilities associated with each possible 3 tuple given 
state 1.
Table A2 about here
Substituting the results of Equations 3,4, 5 and the results given in Tables
Al and A2 into Equation 2, we may calculate the expectation of any 3 tuple,
E(T^). Given these theoretical expressions we are able to estimate parameters 
as described in Section 1.
Table Al
Expressions for Pr(T^/state 2) and Pr(T^/state 3)
Pr(T^/state 2) Pr(T^/state 3)
~3 -3Or O’־׳2 3
—2 - 2ot*■ a a a2 2 3 3
—2 -2Of 0׳ a a
2 2 3 3
ל —a <x — 22 2 a a3 3
— 2 — 2 a O’•6 a2 2 3 3
2 -  2 -a a 0 ׳0 ׳2 2 3 3
2 —  2 —a  a  0f 0׳2 2 3 3
3 3a מ׳־*2 3
* In this table a2׳ = i-a2׳ and 03׳ = l-ay
* In the tree diagram b(n,Q\) represents a Bernoulli process for n trials 
with parameter 0^.
Table A2 
Expressions for Pr(T^/state 1)*
1 Pr(T^/state 1)
1 + ^  +
2 0׳ + ^ d d » 3 + ^ Q 2^ ׳
3 ?! d<* » + <*1a ijto 0 2 + ^ ajdr
4 c^da ־*־ + 2׳
5 0 ״!״ + + ׳ ! ^ Jrd
6 a^ro^Q^ + a1o1׳rdo3׳ + a^a^rd
—  2- 2 27 Q1׳r«2Q2׳ + Q^rrQ^ + Ot Of
2 2— 3— 2
8  °'lr i y 2  + ^ ! r r Q , 2  + 0 I1"
* In this table = 1 -0 ׳ c* 2 = 1־G3 « <2 ׳ = l^־ »  
r = 1 -r, and d = 1 -d.
